Reexamining the Seventh Amendment Argument Against Issue Certification by McNamara, Douglas et al.
Pace Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 3 Summer 2014 Article 2
July 2014
Reexamining the Seventh Amendment Argument
Against Issue Certification
Douglas McNamara
George Washington University Law School
Blake Boghosian
George Washington University Law School
Leila Aminpour
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Douglas McNamara, Blake Boghosian, and Leila Aminpour, Reexamining the Seventh Amendment
Argument Against Issue Certification, 34 Pace L. Rev. 1041 (2014)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
  
 
1041 
Reexamining the Seventh Amendment 
Argument Against Issue Certification 
 
D. McNamara, * B. Boghosian** 
& L. Aminpour*** 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Issue certification is a controversial means of handling aggregate 
claims in Federal Courts.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 
23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”1  Issue 
certification has returned to the radar screen of academics,
2
 class action 
counsel,
3
 and defendants.
4
  The Supreme Court’s decision regarding the 
need for viable damage distribution models in Comcast v. Behrend
5
 may 
spur class counsel in complex cases to bifurcate liability and damages.  
 
* Douglas McNamara is Of Counsel at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, in 
Washington, D.C.  He is an adjunct faculty member of George Washington University 
Law School and has practiced sixteen years in the area of complex civil litigation and 
class actions. 
** Blake Boghossian is a J.D. candidate at George Washington University Law School. 
*** Leila Aminpour graduated from George Washington University Law School and 
now works at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).  Prior to joining the 
CFPB, she was the Consumer Protection Fellow at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll.  Her 
co-authorship of this article is the result of her independent research at Cohen Milstein 
Sellers & Toll and does not necessarily represent the views of the CFPB or the United 
States. 
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
2. Recent publications supporting revitalizing issue certification include Jenna C. 
Smith, “Carving at the Joints”: Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class 
Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2013); John C. Coffee, Jr., The New Class Action 
Landscape: A Trail Map to Class Certification and Practice in the Era After Wal-Mart 
and Concepcion, in THE 15TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS (Am. 
Bar Ass’n 2011). 
3. Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 62 
DEPAUL L. REV. 733, 744 (2013). 
4. JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & JORDAN SCHWARTZ, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: LESSONS FROM EIGHT 
YEARS OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT 15 (2013). 
5. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,  133 S. Ct. 1426, 1436-37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) as a possible response to heightened 
certification requirements). 
1
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The successes of tobacco-injury plaintiffs in Florida’s Engle v. Liggett 
Group cases show that personal injury actions can make use of issue 
class actions.
6
 
Class defendants often assert three common arguments against issue 
certification.  First, certifying a class as to certain issues would make 
class certifications too easy, circumventing the requirements for 
predominance and superiority under FRCP Rule 23(b)(3).
7
  This 
argument has been extensively analyzed and criticized by several courts 
as disregarding the text of Rule 23 and the Advisory Committee’s 
commentary.
8
  Another common argument against issue certification is 
that class treatment and trial on the common issues will not advance a 
case, and is not worth the trouble.
9
  However, making all individuals 
relitigate the common issues repeatedly is even more inefficient.
10
  A 
third argument posited against issue certification—and the one addressed 
in depth here—relates to the Seventh Amendment and the re-
examination clause. 
Until 1995, the Seventh Amendment and class certification 
coexisted with little discussion.  Then, a federal appellate court 
decertified a class of HIV-infected hemophiliacs who sought a class 
action trial of the common issues of their claims against blood factor 
manufacturers.
11
  Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, supported the ruling on several grounds, including that 
 
6. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1269-77 (Fla. 2006) (permitting 
class decision on tort liability, general causation and conspiracy to stand, but requiring 
individual smokers to prove specific causation and damages). 
7. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Perry, supra note 
3, at 744. 
8. See, e.g., In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding that a court may certify a class as to a particular issue despite the fact that 
plaintiffs’ claims taken together do not satisfy Rule 23’s predominance requirement); 
Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004); Gunnells v. Healthplan 
Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The dissent would require a court 
considering the manageability of a class action—a requirement for predominance under 
Rule 23(b)(3)(D)—to pretend that subsection (c)(4)—a provision specifically included to 
make a class action more manageable—does not exist until after the manageability 
determination is made. . . . This reading leaves subsection (c)(4)(A) without any practical 
application, thereby rendering it superfluous.”). 
9. Jones v. Allercare, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 290, 292 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (noting even a 
successful finding on “general causation” would not “necessarily advance the interests of 
the members of the class.”). 
10. Jon Romberg, Half A Loaf Is Predominant and Superior To None: Class 
Certification Of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(C)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 250 
(2002). 
11. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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the proposed bifurcated proceedings could run afoul of the Seventh 
Amendment’s imperative that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law.”12  The court posited that a class jury ruling on 
the matter of negligence of the blood factor manufacturers in the case 
might be reexamined when, in the proposed individual trials, subsequent 
juries considered the plaintiff’s conduct on the issue of comparative 
negligence.
13
  This decision, In re Rhone Poulenc, became the dominant 
precedent cited by courts that subsequently denied attempts to partially 
certify class actions under FRCP 23(c)(4).
14
  As a result, issue 
certification, both as a tool for federal courts to manage complex 
litigation and as a means for plaintiffs seeking streamlining of their suits 
against deep-pocketed defendants, fell mostly into desuetude. 
The Seventh Circuit got the Seventh Amendment wrong.  Critics 
and jurists exploring the historical basis for the Seventh Amendment 
have demonstrated that the Seventh Amendment was included in the Bill 
of Rights to prevent the federal courts from re-litigating entire claims 
already decided by a state court.
15
  The drafters of the Seventh 
Amendment were not focusing on the potential for federal juries to 
review overlapping evidence and reading conflicting results.
16
  However, 
the reexamination argument set out in Rhone Poulenc suffers from even 
more basic weaknesses; chiefly that the defendant raising the Seventh 
Amendment argument pre-certification has suffered no Seventh 
Amendment privation at that time, and likely would only see their loss 
reexamined to their benefit if a careless judge or rogue jury did revisit 
common issues decided by the class jury.  The Seventh Amendment 
argument is sorely speculative and cannot justify denying issue 
 
12. The full text of the Seventh Amendment states: 
 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
13. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d at 1303. 
14. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); infra note 
36. 
15. See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D 86, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Romberg, 
supra note 10, at 250; Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation And The Seventh 
Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1998). 
16. See supra note 15. 
3
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certification. 
Issue certification does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment 
because of the constitutional doctrines of standing and ripeness.  Part 
II(A) and II(B) examines FRCP 23 and the history of class actions and 
issue certifications.  Next, Part II(C) analyzes Rhone Poulenc and its 
Seventh Amendment analysis.  Part III(A) argues that ripeness and 
standing undermine Seventh Amendment arguments concerning 
reexamination.  First, as to ripeness, the reexamination argument relies 
on a series of speculations: that the class plaintiffs will prevail on the 
trial of the common issues; and that a second jury would—contrary to 
legal presumptions
17
 — ignore the trial judge’s instructions, and then 
reexamine some part of the class decision.  These multiple suppositions 
should not preclude issue classes.  Second, even if the matter becomes 
ripe, the defendant will still lack standing: it is only when the issue-class 
plaintiff prevails on the first round that a second jury could exist.  If the 
second jury spurns the trial court’s instructions by revisiting issues 
decided in the first trial, that reexamination would likely redound to the 
defendant’s benefit, diminishing in some manner the common issue 
finding favoring the class plaintiffs.  Thus, the defendants would lack 
standing to advance a Seventh Amendment claim because the defendants 
would suffer no harm.  Finally, Part III(B) notes that the class 
plaintiffs—the likely potential victims of any jury reexamination—can 
avoid a Seventh Amendment complaint by voluntarily and knowingly 
waiving violations, just as American citizens can for any of their 
constitutional rights. 
 
II.   Rule 23 And Issue Certification 
 
A. The Emergence of Class Actions 
 
Justice Story—while serving as a circuit judge—developed the 
elements of today’s modern class action..18  The Supreme Court  adopted 
 
17. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (noting “the almost 
invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions . . . .”); Tennessee v. 
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (noting the “crucial assumption that the jurors followed 
the instructions given them by the trial judge”) (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 
422, 438 n.6 (1983) (citations omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Woolley, 
supra note 15, at 526 (explaining that courts generally presume that juries will follow 
their instructions). 
18. See West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721-23 (C.C.D. R.I. 1820) (No. 17424); 
see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS § 9 (3d ed. 1844) 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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his standards,
19
 and then Congress codified them in the precursor to the 
FRCP: the Federal Equity Rules.
20
  One of these precursors to FRCP 23, 
Federal Equity Rule 38 of 1912, stated merely: “When the question is 
one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class 
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the 
 
(discussing the categories of class actions); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the 
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 
HARV. L. REV. 356, 376-77 (1967).  The modern-day “class action” had probably existed 
in some form long before Justice Story formulated his rules. As noted by Judge 
Heartfield: 
 
Although it appears that the modern-day class action was born 
probably some time during the Middle Ages, there are reports of 
ecclesiastical proceedings against numerous insects and animals 
dating as early as A.D. 824. . . . Inhabitants of an area afflicted with 
locusts, rats, weevils, or other depredators would petition the Church 
for relief.  The offending insects or rodents would be summoned to 
court, and, upon their inevitable nonappearance, tried in abstentia 
[sic], and ordered to cease and desist from their wrongful behavior 
and to depart the area, or to suffer excommunication and church 
anathemas. 
 
Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946-47 (E.D. Tex. 2000) 
(citations omitted). 
19. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).  In handling a dispute 
between the north and south factions of the United Methodist Church divided by slavery, 
the court adopted Justice Story’s formulation as to suits in representative capacity: 
 
The rule is well established that where the parties interested are 
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of 
the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the 
others; and a bill may also be maintained against a portion of a 
numerous body of defendants, representing a common interest. . . . 
Where the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights and 
liabilities are so subject to change and fluctuation by death or 
otherwise, that it would not be possible, without very great 
inconvenience, to make all of them parties, and would oftentimes 
prevent the prosecution of the suit to a hearing.  For convenience, 
therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits 
a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the 
decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court.  The 
legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being before the court 
by representation, and especially where the subject-matter of the suit 
is common to all, there can be very little danger but that the interest 
of all will be properly protected and maintained. 
 
Id. at 298-303. 
20. Romberg, supra note 10, at 257. 
5
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court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”21  Based upon this 
language in Federal Equity Rule 38 of 1912, and long before Rule 23’s 
creation, courts engaged in what would now be called the kind of “issue 
certification” that later courts found to be possible under Rule 23(c)(4).22 
The purpose of Rule 23, therefore, was to articulate formal rules for 
the consolidation of similar cases, as opposed to the earlier custom of 
leaving this process up to the wide discretion of trial judges.
23
  Rule 23 
imposed specific requirements such as numerosity, commonality, 
providing adequate notice, etc., to any group seeking “class action” 
certification.
24
  These requirements empowered judges to consolidate 
claims in response to increasing strains upon judicial resources.
25
 
 
B. The Emergence of Issue Certifications under 23(c)(4) 
 
In the 1966 amendments, Rule 23(c)(4) was revised to read, “When 
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action 
with respect to particular issues.”26 The Advisory Committee provided as 
an example “a fraud or similar case [where] the action may retain its 
 
21. Id. (quoting Fed. Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912) (repealed 1938)). 
22. See, e.g., Carnahan v. Peabody, 31 F.2d 311, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (holding that 
a representative suit may be brought on behalf of a large number of a deceased’s heirs, in 
order to determine the issue of whether a trust created by the deceased’s brothers was 
invalid); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1297, 1300-01 (1932) (“Nothing in the nature of things prevents a law judge from 
doing much more to bring about a convenient unification of parallel suits pending in his 
court between different parties, and codes or practice acts often give him this power. 
Thus a federal statute provides: ‘When causes of a like nature or relative to the same 
question are pending before a court of the United States . . . the court may make such 
orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the usages of 
courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the administration of justice, and may 
consolidate said causes when it appears reasonable to do so.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 734 
(1926), derived from 3 Stat. 21 (1813)). 
23. Kaplan, supra note 18, at 376. 
24. Id.; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). 
25. When FRCP Rule 23 was created in 1938, the principles of claim and issue 
consolidation that existed in simple language within the Federal Equity Rules were 
transformed into a series of rules that distinguished cases into categories, which were 
often vague. Rule 23’s amendment in 1966 attempted to discard this vague language and 
make the process more practical. See Kaplan, supra note 18, at 376-80..  As the drafters 
amended the rules to make them more practical they also attempted to make them more 
inclusive, rejecting early suggestions which would not have included some of the current 
grounds for class action certification (specifically those under Rule 23(b)(3)). Id. at 394 
(“This timid course was unthinkable in the face of the insistent need to improve the 
methods of handling litigation affecting groups.”). 
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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‘class’ character only through the adjudication of liability to the class; 
the members of the class may thereafter be required to come in 
individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims.”27  Thus, 
Rule 23(c)(4) permits courts to resolve some parts of complex claims 
piecemeal when all components of the claim are not eligible for class 
certification.
28
 
After the 1966 amendments, many courts certified “issue classes” 
by treating the common issues of plaintiffs’ claims as a single triable 
matter, severing individual examinations for subsequent trials.
29
  These 
courts did not mention a potential Seventh Amendment conflict with 
issue certification.
30
  However, the long tradition of class and issue 
certifications that existed before and after the creation of Rule 23 was 
severely chilled in the mid-1990’s. 
 
 
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee’s note. 
28. Simon v. Phillip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 29-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The 
framers of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) considered class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3)--
characteristically disputes that involve numerous individual proofs of causation and 
injury--particularly well suited for certification of fewer than all issues. Their conclusion 
follows from the fact that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) assists in satisfying Rule 23(b)(3)’s additional 
class certification requirements of predominance and superiority.”) (citations omitted). 
29. See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 
1993) (affirming certification in asbestos action of eight issues regarding defendants’ 
conduct because “[s]ignificant economies may be achieved by relieving [plaintiffs] of the 
need to prove over and over when defendants knew or should have known of asbestos’ 
hazards, or whether defendants engaged in concerted efforts to conceal this knowledge, 
or even whether certain of defendants’ products crumble and release dust . . . .”); Sterling 
v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988) (in land contamination 
case, stating that “[i]n mass tort accidents, the factual and legal issues of a defendant’s 
liability do not differ dramatically from one plaintiff to the next” and using Rule 
23(c)(4)(A) to certify issues of “the level and duration of chemical contamination, the 
causal connection, if any, between the plaintiffs’ consumption of the contaminated water 
and the type of injuries allegedly suffered, and the defendant’s liability” while leaving 
individual proofs of amount of damages for later proceedings); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 
789 F.2d 996, 1008-09 (3d Cir. 1986) (approving certification of liability issues in 
asbestos litigation because “[e]ven if the action thereafter ‘degenerates’ into a series of 
individual damage suits, the result nevertheless works an improvement over the situation 
in which the same separate suits require an adjudication on liability using the same 
evidence over and over again.”); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 471 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (affirming certification in asbestos personal injury action of “defense-related 
questions” such as product identification, product defectiveness, gross negligence, and 
“state of the art” defense); see generally In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 
381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming certification of asbestos personal injury 
settlement class based on centrality of question of military contractor defense). 
30. See, e.g., Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 474 (asserting with little comment that 
“Defendants’ constitutional challenges to bifurcation are . . . unavailing”). 
7
  
1048 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  34:3 
C. Rhone Poulenc and the Rejection of Issue Certification. 
 
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit heard a mandamus appeal regarding a 
class certification order issued by Judge Grady, who presided over a 
multidistrict litigation of contaminated blood factor lawsuits.
31
  Plaintiffs 
were hemophiliacs infected by AIDS who sued the blood factor 
manufacturers under their respective state laws.
32
  Plaintiffs alleged that 
over two thousand  hemophiliacs died of AIDS, with as many as twenty 
thousand possibly HIV-positive.
33
  Plaintiffs sought a national class 
action on the issue of defendants’ liability, alleging that if the 
manufacturers had been more vigilant with respect to screening donors 
for hepatitis B, they would have decreased the likelihood of HIV 
contaminating their products.
34
  Plaintiffs also alleged that the 
manufacturers were slow to take on other measures that could have 
prevented contamination.
35
  The trial court found too many differences 
between the class members for certification under FRCP Rule 23(b)(3).
36
  
However, the court ruled that a class could litigate the common question 
of negligence, and then (if the defendants were found liable for 
negligence), individual class members could try their remaining issues, 
such as causation and damages.
37
  After the court issued an order under 
Rule 23(c)(4), the defendants appealed via a writ of mandamus.
38
 
The Seventh Circuit granted the mandamus petition and ruled that 
the issue certification “exceeded the bounds of allowable judicial 
discretion.”39  Judge Posner, writing for the majority, rested the decision 
 
31. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995). 
32. Id. at 1394. 
33. Id. at 1296. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1296-97. 
36. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 422 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
FRCP Rule 23(b)(3) allows for class treatment of a claim where the plaintiff can show 
the perquisites of Rule 23(a) (numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of class 
representative and counsel) as well as “the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
37. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 422-23. 
38. Rule 23 was amended in 1998 to provide greater discretion to appellate courts 
to review class certification rulings.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
39. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d  at 1303.  The court came to this conclusion for 
three reasons: First, the court asserted a policy argument, a “concern with forcing these 
defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by 
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability, when it is 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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on the reexamination clause of the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution.
40
  Judge Posner reasoned that a class trial on negligence 
would inexorably lead to subsequent juries reexamining the same issues: 
 
A second or subsequent jury might find that the 
defendants’ failure to take precautions against infection 
with Hepatitis B could not be thought the proximate 
cause of the plaintiffs’ infection with HIV, a different 
and unknown blood-borne virus.  How the resulting 
inconsistency between juries could be prevented escapes 
us.
41
 
 
The Rhone Poulenc court’s Seventh Amendment analysis relied 
primarily upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Gasoline Products Co. v. 
Champlin Refining Co.
42
  However, the Gasoline Produce decision says 
little about the Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, its 
purpose, and its application. 
In Gasoline Products, the plaintiff sued for royalties under a 
licensing contract regarding a patented process of manufacture.
43
  The 
defendant (Champlin) counterclaimed for damages, alleging that the 
plaintiff failed to perform a related contract to construct part of a plant.
44
  
The district court refused to allow the jury to consider Champlin’s 
counterclaim, and Gasoline Products won its royalty claim.
45
  The First 
Circuit reversed, finding Champlin had presented sufficient evidence for 
its counterclaim.
46
  At the retrial, the parties stipuled to Gasoline 
 
entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative determination of their liability for the 
colossal misfortune that has befallen the hemophiliac population to emerge from a 
decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards 
of liability, in different jurisdictions.” Id. at 1299.  The second articulated concern was 
more pragmatic: that the district judge, “propose[d] to have a jury determine the 
negligence of the defendants under a legal standard that does not actually exist in the 
world,” but is rather based on “the concept of ‘general’ common law.”  Id. at 1300.  The 
third reason was that bifurcation in this case would lead to subsequent juries reexamining 
the first jury’s findings, in violation of the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 1302. 
40. Id. at 1303. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1303 (citing Gasoline Prods. Co., v. Champlin Refining Co, 283 U.S. 494 
(1931)). 
43. Gasoline Prods., 283 U.S. at 495. 
44. Id. 
45. Champlin Refining Co. v. Gasoline Prods. Co., 29 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1928). 
46. Id.at 338-39. 
9
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Product’s royalty damages .47  Champlin received a favorable verdict on 
it counterclaim, but for a sum about $20,000 less than owed to Gasoline 
Products.
48
  The First Circuit again reversed, agreeing with Champlin 
that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on calculating 
damages.
49
  The court vacated the verdict “only as to damages” and the 
case was “remanded to that court for a new trial on the question of 
defendant’s damages.”50  The court’s opinion did not reference the 
Seventh Amendment. 
On appeal, Gasoline Products claimed that by limiting the new trial 
only to damages—and preventing it from arguing an absence of liability 
under Champlin’s alleged contracts—the ruling violated its Seventh 
Amendment rights to have a single jury hear the entire claim.
51
  The 
Supreme Court reviewed prior decisions on re-trials and partial verdicts, 
and cited to the Seventh Amendment in passing.
52
  The Court rejected 
Gasoline Product’s broad argument that any error found in a part of one 
verdict necessitated a full retrial.
53
  In a holding with seemingly little 
relevance to issue certification, the Court held “where the requirement of 
a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to law upon one 
issue of fact, that requirement does not compel a new trial of that issue 
even though another and separable issue must be tried again.”54  
However, the Court found that the issue of damages, including profit loss 
and mitigated damages, could not be separated from liability under the 
counterclaim due to the confusing record and conflicting testimony.
55
  
Because the re-trial jury could not be instructed to assume material facts 
essential to assess damages, a retrial on all aspects of the counterclaim 
was ordered.
56
  Importantly, the Court relied on the Due Process Clause 
for its full re-trial decision,  and not the Seventh Amendment,  finding 
that “the question of damages on the counterclaim is so interwoven with 
that of liability that the former cannot be submitted to the jury 
independently of the latter without confusion and uncertainty, which 
 
47. Gasoline Prods.Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 39 F.2d 521, 521 (1930). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 524. 
50. Id. 
51. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497 (1931). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 500. 
54. Id.at 499. 
55. Id.at 500. 
56. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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would amount to a denial of a fair trial.”57 
The Gasoline Products decision reveals little about the applicability 
of the re-examination clause.  In fact, it seems that on a cleaner record on 
contract formation and loss mitigation, the Court may have upheld the 
First Circuit’s decision limiting the re-trial to damages.  Nevertheless, 
subsequent courts and commentators generally accepted the Rhone-
Poulenc analysis of the Seventh Amendment and Gasoline Products, and 
applied it to later cases.
58
  The Fifth Circuit ran furthest with the Rhone 
 
57. Gasoline Prod. Co., 283 U.S. at 500-01. 
58. See, e.g., Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the lower court impermissibly bifurcated the liability and damages issues in the action in 
violation of the Seventh Amendment); Cimino v. Raymark Ind., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320-
21 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant’s Seventh Amendment rights were violated 
when a jury was not permitted to determine the amount of damages owed to each 
plaintiff); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting 
certification of tobacco companies’ conspiracy to hide addictiveness of cigarettes and 
whether nicotine was addictive, citing to state law differences and the Seventh 
Amendment); In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 317 (N.D. Ohio 
2007) (holding bifurcation not appropriate in products liability case because “[t]he 
undersigned is not entirely confident that, were it to certify sua sponte a smaller class or 
more limited issues, it would avoid” the reexamination problems encountered in Rhone-
Poulenc); Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chem. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 315-16 (S.D. Ala. 
2006) (rejecting issue certification, noting that the second jury would have to reconsider 
defendant’s conduct when considering causation and damages); Benner v. Becton 
Dickinson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying issue certification 
because issues of negligence and comparative negligence were too interrelated and 
thereby certification would lead to violation of the Seventh Amendment); In re Methyl 
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(denying issue certification because dividing litigation between general and specific 
liability would violate the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause); Rink v. 
Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 652 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“[E]ven if this Court were to 
accept the Plaintiffs’ invitation to certify a class action limited only to the so-called 
common issue of whether the Defendants delivered a defective product, and even if a jury 
answered this question in the Plaintiffs’ favor, any subsequent mini-trial involving the 
issue of whether the delivery of the defective product caused injury and damage to a 
particular Plaintiff would necessarily have to involve all of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the delivery of the product if the Defendants are to receive the benefit of 
Florida’s law governing the apportionment of fault.”); O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 
197 F.R.D. 404, 415 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A] class trial on liability without any reference 
to the limitations defense runs ‘the real risk . . . of a composite case being much stronger 
than any plaintiff’s individual action would be . . . .’”); Cohn v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co.,189 F.R.D. 209, 219 (D. Conn. 1999) (denying certification because of the potential 
for relitigating interrelated issues that would violate the Seventh Amendment); Emig v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 379, 393 n.14, 395 (D. Kan. 1998) (The Court 
“recognizes that there is some disagreement on whether trying a single plaintiff’s claims 
to multiple juries violates defendants’ Seventh Amendment rights.  However, reaching 
that issue is not necessary because the court finds that there are sufficient reasons, other 
than any Seventh Amendment concern, to deny certification.”  The court denied FRCP 
23(c)(4) certification where “the general causation questions of whether cigarettes cause 
11
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Poulenc decision.  In Castano v. American Tobacco Co., the court 
certified a nationwide class of nicotine-addicted smokers.
59
  It noted the 
“core liability issues” as whether the tobacco companies knew about 
nicotine addiction and had deliberately suppressed other common 
components of causes of action for fraud, elements of the consumer 
protection claims, and the breach of warranty.
60
  The Fifth Circuit 
reversed, concluding issue certification “would write the predominance 
requirement [of FRCP 23(b)(3)] out of the rule, and any common issue 
would predominate if it were common to all the individual trials.”61  
Castano also cited to the Seventh Amendment and Rhone Poulenc to 
decertify the class.
62
 
In this line of case law, only courts within the Second Circuit 
sounded a different note.  In a prelude to a decision where he 
contemplated the application of issue certification of to civil RICO 
claims against cigarette companies, longtime District Court Judge Jack 
Weinstein wrote a lengthy opinion that followed the historical 
antecedents of the Seventh Amendment and criticized Rhone Poulenc 
and its progeny: 
 
[T]he Framers’ main objective in drafting the Seventh 
Amendment was to limit the ability of an appellate court, 
specifically the Supreme Court, to review de novo and 
overturn a civil jury’s findings of fact. Nowhere is there 
an indication that the Framers intended to constrain the 
trial judge’s substantial discretion to employ appropriate 
mechanisms of jury control.
63
 
 
the harms alleged by plaintiffs are invariably bound up in their claims that cigarettes 
caused their injuries[,]” which presents individualized questions.); In re Masonite Corp. 
Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 417, 425-26 (E.D. La. 1997) (stating 
that “bifurcation of manufacturer conduct and comparative negligence can violate 
Seventh Amendment considerations by having the second jury reconsider the decided 
factual question of manufacturer negligence.”); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (bifurcating general and specific causation 
may violate the Seventh Amendment because of the “genuine risk that the general issue 
would be ‘redecided’ by the subsequent jury.”). 
59. Castano, 84 F.3d 734, 739-40. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 744-45. 
62. Id. at 751 (stating that in a comparative negligence case, “[t]here is a risk that in 
apportioning fault, the second jury could reevaluate the defendant’s fault, determine that 
the defendant was not at fault, and apportion 100% of the fault to the plaintiff,” which 
violates the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause). 
63. Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); see also 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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The Second Circuit cited to Judge Weinstein in rejecting the 
Castano decision, and encouraged the use of FRCP 23(c)(4), with little 
concern over the Seventh Amendment argument.
64
  Several other 
opinions have followed suit, including courts in the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits.
65
 
Meanwhile, Judge Posner seemed to change his views on class 
actions.  In a 2003 decision, Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp, the 
defendant appealed via FRCP 23(f), from the grant of class certification 
in a groundwater pollution case.
66
  The district court certified the “core 
questions” of “whether or not and to what extent [Met-Coil] caused 
contamination of the area in question.”67  Writing for the court, Judge 
Posner wrote that judicial economy favored treating the general liability 
 
Woolley, supra note 15 at 509 (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History 
of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 679 (1973)) (“Anti-Federalists feared 
the federal courts would oppress local debtors on behalf of out-of-state creditors. The fact 
that retrials on appeal in the Supreme Court might be by jury provided little comfort.  As 
Professor Wolfram has explained, ‘the last resort for the hounded debtor was a hopefully 
sympathetic jury in his local federal court.’  In addition, Anti-Federalists were concerned 
about the cost of retrying cases in the capital.  For these reasons, the Anti-Federalists 
sought not only to preserve the right to jury trial, but to ensure that no retrials whatsoever 
would take place in the Supreme Court.”). 
64. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that bifurcation does not violate the Seventh Amendment, as long as 
particular factual issues are not re-tried by a subsequent jury).  The Second Circuit has 
similarly supported issue certification in many opinions – so long as the issues do not 
completely overlap, the jury has been properly instructed, and where certifying issues 
would actually provide efficiency.  See, e.g., Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2007) (instructing the district court on 
remand from reversal of denial of certification to consider whether certification on the 
issue of antitrust injury was warranted) (citations omitted); In re Nassau Cnty. Strip 
Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting Castano and holding that a 
court may certify a class as to a particular issue despite the fact that plaintiffs’ claims 
taken together do not satisfy FRCP 23’s predominance requirement).  Contra 
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co. 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that issue 
certification was not available in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
case, alleging decades-long fraud on the safety of lower-tar cigarettes because issues of 
reliance, injury, and damages were so great that issue classes would not promote judicial 
economy). See Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding the 
district court lacked a trial plan to ensure issues would not overlap and be re-examined). 
65. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Castano, 
holding that district court correctly found that common issues predominate, despite the 
need to determine damages on an individualized basis); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 
Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003). 
66. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003). 
67. Id. at 911. 
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issues in “one fell swoop,” leaving individual issues to be decided after.68  
Posner referenced Rhone Poulenc, but not the Seventh Amendment 
discussion. Rather than fret over a “reexamination,” Posner suggested as 
some solace to the defendants that if the class jury was wrong about the 
extent of defendant’s misconduct, the individual juries would serve as a 
backstop to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
69
 
While these more recent decisions have sidestepped (or sideswiped) 
the Seventh Amendment holding in Rhone Poulenc, what has been 
ignored is the more basic question of whether or not defendants’ 
Constitutional rights are actually violated when the issue certification is 
granted.  Whose rights are at issue when a potential second jury 
“reexamines” the decision of the first “issues class” jury?  Can the class 
members—concluding that some class treatment is better than none—
waive their reexamination rights under the Seventh Amendment, thereby 
removing the potential Seventh Amendment violation as a basis to deny 
issue certification? 
 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 912 (“First, the two questions that the judge has set for class treatment – 
whether there was unlawful contamination and what the geographical scope of the 
contamination was – are not especially complex. Second, even if these questions are 
answered against Met-Coil, the consequences for it will not be catastrophic. The 
individual class members will still have to prove the fact and extent of their individual 
injuries. The need for such proof will act as a backstop to the class-wide 
determinations.”); see also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 
2004) (relying on FRCP 23(c)(4) to certify a RICO claim as to fraud, without reference to 
the Seventh Amendment). 
Very recently, the Fifth Circuit seemed to ignore Castano’s imperative that a class must 
meet certification under FRCP 23(b)(3) before consideration of issue certification. In 
approving a settlement of the economic damages for business hurt by the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf, the court blithely noted that the district court could have 
simply considered liability issues separately, undercutting BP’s argument that Article III 
required determining that each class members suffered an injury. In re Deepwater 
Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “the district court anticipated that 
‘issues relating to damages’ could and would be ‘severed and tried separately’ from other 
issues relating to liability, in accordance with this court’s previous case law and Rule 
23(c)(4) . . . This court has previously ‘approved mass tort or mass accident class actions 
when the district court was able to rely on a manageable trial plan—including 
bifurcation’ of ‘class-wide liability issues’ and issues of individual damages.”) (citing 
Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2006)). The court 
also cited with approval the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
stating, “[A] class action limited to determining liability on a class-wide basis, with 
separate hearings to determine—if liability is established—the damages of individual 
class members, or homogeneous groups of class members, is permitted by Rule 23(c)(4) 
and will often be the sensible way to proceed.” Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 
796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013). Not once did the court cite Castano. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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III.  The Seventh Amendment Should Not Present A Bar To Issue 
Certification 
 
Ever since Rhone Poulenc, defendants facing an issue certification 
routinely present the Seventh Amendment “reexamination clause” 
argument as the last line in a parade of horribles.
70
  But consider the 
layers of speculation that underlie the supposed reexamination violation.  
For example, the Castano court stated: 
 
Another factor weighing heavily in favor of individual 
trials is the risk that in order to make this class action 
manageable, the court will be forced to bifurcate issues 
in violation of the Seventh Amendment.  This class 
action is permeated with individual issues, such as 
proximate causation, comparative negligence, reliance, 
and compensatory damages . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . At a bare minimum, a second jury will rehear 
evidence of the defendant’s conduct.  There is a risk that 
in apportioning fault, the second jury could reevaluate 
the defendant’s fault, determine that the defendant was 
not at fault, and apportion 100% of the fault to the 
plaintiff.  In such a situation, the second jury would be 
impermissibly reconsidering the findings of a first jury.  
The risk of such reevaluation is so great that class 
treatment can hardly be said to be superior to individual 
adjudication.
71
 
 
70. See, e.g., IMI Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Class Certification and in Support of Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony and Opinion 
of Dr. John Beyer at 30 n.48, 55, In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. 1:05-
cv-00979-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 2548951 (S.D. Ind. April 7, 2008) (stating that “because 
impact/injury is an element of liability, the Seventh Amendment prohibits” bifurcation of 
damages.); Defendants’ Motion to Decertify the Class at 16, In re Nw. Airlines Corp. 
Antitrust Litig., No. 2:96-cv-74711-GCS, 2005 WL 3677173 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2005) 
(“Whether and to what extent an individual class member was reimbursed goes directly 
to the issue of whether that class member was injured by the alleged conduct.  Because 
the trial jury will be asked to decide on a classwide basis whether individual class 
members have been injured, subsequent determinations by a different factfinder in a 
‘reimbursement proceeding’ would entail constitutionally impermissible reexamination 
of issues addressed by the trial jury.”). 
71. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis 
15
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The emphasized words above highlight the nature of the possible 
“reexamination.”  Instead of conjecture, the court considering an issue 
certification should remember “ripeness,” “standing,” and “waiver.”  
Because a potential reexamination clause violation can only appear after 
the plaintiffs prevail in the initial trial and a second jury fails to heed the 
trial court’s instructions to consider only the issues before it, any 
Constitutional infraction can only be ripe after a class plaintiffs’ victory.  
Thus, under the doctrines of ripeness and standing, no defendant could 
mount a legitimate Constitutional attack to issue certification at the time 
 
added).  While the Fifth Circuit has stood by Castano, see, e.g., Allison v. Citgo 
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998), it has deviated in some odd 
situations.  In Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999), the 
court distinguished Castano in upholding an issue certification of workers at a floating 
casino who sued for respiratory injuries related to second-hand smoke under the Jones 
Act.  Id. at 629.  The court’s discussion of the Seventh Amendment appears to single out 
comparative negligence as something that could be bifurcated, unlike causation: 
 
In Castano, this Court expressed a concern that having one jury 
consider the defendant's conduct and another consider the plaintiffs’ 
comparative negligence could create Seventh Amendment problems. 
. . . 
. . . [W]e would not find the risk of infringing upon the parties’ 
Seventh Amendment rights significant in this case. . . . In Castano, 
we were concerned that allowing a second jury to consider the 
plaintiffs’ comparative negligence would invite that jury to 
reconsider the first jury’s findings concerning the defendants’ 
conduct.  We believe that such a risk has been avoided here by 
leaving all issues of causation for the phase-two jury.  When a jury 
considers the comparative negligence of a plaintiff, “the focus is 
upon causation.  It is inevitable that a comparison of the conduct of 
plaintiffs and defendants ultimately be in terms of causation.” . . . 
Thus, in considering comparative negligence, the phase-two jury 
would not be reconsidering the first jury’s findings of whether 
Treasure Chest’s conduct was negligent or the Casino unseaworthy, 
but only the degree to which those conditions were the sole or 
contributing cause of the class member’s injury.  Because the first 
jury will not be considering any issues of causation, no Seventh 
Amendment implications affect our review of the district court’s 
superiority finding. 
 
Id. at 628-29 (citations omitted).  But this distinction ignores that the first jury would still 
be assessing what the floating casino knew about its supposedly inadequate ventilation 
system, when it knew it, and whether it was negligent – all things the individual jury 
could reconsider in the individual phase if viewed the same skeptical way as the court did 
in Castano.  It is unclear how the comparative negligence issue in Mullen avoids the risk 
of reexamination any differently than the negligence and general causations in Castano. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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of class motion.  Moreover, only the class plaintiffs would likely suffer 
from a reexamination; if the first jury found for the defendant, the case 
ends for every member of the class.  As such, only the class plaintiffs 
would have standing to raise a Seventh Amendment violation. 
 
A.  Standing When Challenging a Seventh Amendment Reexamination      
      Violation 
 
Standing “is the threshold question in every federal case” and is a 
bedrock requirement for a litigant wishing to raise a legal right: 
 
In essence the question of standing is whether the 
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of 
the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves 
both constitutional limitations on federal-court 
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In 
both dimensions it is founded in concern about the 
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a 
democratic society.
72
 
 
The Constitutional basis for establishing standing stems from the 
“[Article] III judicial power [which] exists only to redress or otherwise to 
protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s 
judgment may benefit others collaterally.”73 Therefore, a “federal court’s 
jurisdiction . . . can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has 
suffered ‘some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively 
illegal action.’”74  A “generalized grievance” is not enough; only the 
party harmed may “assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot 
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”75 
The standing requirement dooms the opposition of most defendants 
raising Seventh Amendment objections to issue certification motions.  
Because the potential of a Seventh Amendment reexamination scenario 
is speculative at the time a defendant opposes class certification, no 
actual injury has ripened.
76
  Second, even if a jury did revisit the findings 
 
72. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
73. Id. at 499. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
76. The specter of a Seventh Amendment violation untethered to an actual injury to 
a class defendants is displayed in Perry, supra note 3, at  742-43.  Mr. Perry, a partner at 
17
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of the first jury, it is the class plaintiffs who are likely wronged, and the 
defendants cannot raise their violation to undo the class action. 
 
1.    Seventh Amendment Rights of Litigants Are Not Violated Until 
An Issue Has Actually Been Reexamined 
 
Overwrought speculation about what subsequent juries may decide 
once the class trial moves to the next level will not suffice the “ripeness” 
test for standing. The Rhone Poulenc court overemphasized a potential 
conflict before one developed.
77
  In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the 
Supreme Court laid out specific requirements which must be met in order 
for a plaintiff to claim a violation of their Constitutional rights.
78
  
Primary among these was the element of personal injury.
79
  Specifically, 
the Supreme Court found that in order to establish a personal injury, a 
litigant must show that they are actually harmed by the Constitutional 
violation.
80
  Moreover, the harm must be “actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”81 
The possibility that a second jury could reexamine the findings of 
the first does not meet the “actual or imminent” requirement to establish 
personal injury.  Both juries can examine overlapping evidence; the 
reexamination clause only prohibits the second jury from deciding 
factual issues that were common to both trials and essential to the 
 
Gibson Dunn who represents large defendants in class actions, simply notes that the 
potential for a reexamination raises sufficient  “concerns” to support complete rejection 
of issue certification to avoid any constitutional conflict: 
 
The Reexamination Clause forbids two separate jury trials for the 
same claims and facts.  As the Court has stated in interpreting this 
Clause, two jury trials may not be used for the same case “unless it 
clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable 
from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”  
Claim elements and defenses, however, are not “distinct and 
separable” from liability. . . . Therefore, “partial certification” raises 
significant constitutional concerns, and the rule of constitutional 
avoidance counsels against an expansive use of Rule 23(c)(4). 
 
Perry, supra note 3, at  742-43. 
77. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
78. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). 
79. Id. at 578. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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outcome.
82
  Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants are in any 
“imminent” danger of harm because giving a second jury the opportunity 
to potentially reexamine evidence that an initial jury already passed on 
does not ensure that the second jury will actually reexamine the legal 
issues and reach a contradictory verdict that deprives the initial party of 
its litigation victory.  Regarding ripeness, the plaintiff in Lujan 
complained that by denying extraterritorial application of the Endangered 
Species Act to activities supported by the U.S. that threatened animals in 
other countries, her Constitutional rights would be violated if she were to 
travel to another country, as she could not make a claim.
83
  However, this 
concern lacked imminence because she did not have any concrete plans 
to visit another country, nor could produce a plane ticket or a planned 
date of travel, etc..
84
  Similarly, at the time of issue certification, it is far 
from inevitable that a second jury will even be used, as the defendants 
might win or the case might settle. 
Not only is the possibility of a “reexamination” speculative but it 
can be easily averted.  The trial court can give verdict sheets to the juries 
that limit what issues they may consider.
85
  The common issue jury can 
be given specific issues upon which to render a verdict, and the 
individual issue juries can be limited via verdict sheets to making 
findings on causation and damages.  For example, in Rhone-Poulenc, 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were at fault for not warning their 
customers of the risk of HIV in their products from 1980-1985.
86
  If the 
common issue jury held that the defendants could not have known of the 
risks until 1983, but an individual issue jury sided with the plaintiff, 
despite finding he used the products only before 1983, the trial court 
 
82. Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1127-28 (7th Cir. 
1999) (finding no Seventh Amendment violation where trial over airplane crash was 
bifurcated between suit against pilot and manufacturer; passengers distinct legal theories 
against defendants presented overlapping evidence that a jury could independently find 
both defendants’ conduct were substantial factors causing the crash); In re Innotron 
Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (bifurcation of anti-trust and patent 
claims upheld despite likelihood that “most of the facts and issues in the patent trial 
[were] overwhelmingly intertwined and overlapping with those in [the anti-trust 
claim].”); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1112, 1117 (D. Del. 1984) (noting that the Seventh Amendment 
is concerned about factual conclusions, not evidence: “The prohibition is not against 
having two juries review the same evidence, but rather against having two juries decide 
the same essential issues.”). 
83. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 588. 
84. Id. at 592. 
85. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
86. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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could throw out the contradictory verdict.
87
  This coincides with the more 
recent and refined “backstop” understanding of the “individual issues” 
jury that Judge Posner described in Mejdrech.
88
 If the class jury held 
defendants were responsible for a groundwater plume that included 
plaintiff’s property, but the individual jury found the plaintiff failed to 
show any contamination (or  any actual damages due to the 
contamination), the second jury has not “reexamined” the first jury’s 
verdict in a manner that violates  anyone’s Constitutional rights, let alone 
that of the  defendant.  In addition, if needed, the defendant could also 
move for judgment as a matter of law to enforce the specific terms of the 
first jury’s intended verdict.89 
 
2.   The Reexamination Violation, if it Ever Arose, Would Most 
Likely Affect the Class Plaintiffs, and Defendants would Lack 
Standing to Object 
 
The Rhone-Poulenc court reasoned that reexamination of an issue 
could occur if the plaintiffs were to receive a favorable verdict from the 
initial jury at the issue-class trial, and then if subsequent juries chose to 
reexamine that favorable verdict when they decided the remaining issues 
of each plaintiff’s respective case.90  But, if the plaintiffs lost the certified 
issue of negligence, there would be no subsequent trials to determine 
damages, and no risk of reexamination of the issues.  In fact, it is likely 
that in most issue certifications, the initial jury impaneled to hear the 
certified issues will hear threshold issues such as liability, while 
subsequent juries will decide subordinate issues such as damages.  This 
means that when a subsequent jury is impaneled, the defendant has 
already been found liable for something, leaving the subsequent jury to 
 
87. See Simon v. Phillip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting 
that trial judges have historically been allowed to use procedural devices to exert control 
over jury verdicts, including “remittitur, new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
demurrer to the evidence, directed verdict, special verdict and nonsuit.”); Woolley, supra 
note 15, at 528 (noting prevention of contradictory verdicts, “can be achieved in the 
bifurcation context by requiring that the formal findings of a jury be given estoppel 
effect. Provided later juries respect the rules of direct estoppel, the second phase of a 
bifurcated proceeding cannot be used to evade limits on review.”). 
88. Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003). 
89. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 396 (2006) 
(stating that “a party in a civil jury trial that believes the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support an adverse jury verdict will seek a judgment as a matter of law”). 
90. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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decide individual matters like causation and damages
91
 or whether the 
plaintiff relied on a misrepresentation.
92
  At this point, there are only two 
options for the subsequent jury: either it can accept the verdict of liability 
that the initial jury found during the class trial (this is what it must do as 
a matter of law, and what it is presumed to do);
93
 or it can “go rogue,” 
and potentially violate the Seventh Amendment by reexamining and 
negating the findings of the first jury.  On the remote chance the 
subsequent jury “goes rogue”, then the only party that can be harmed is 
the previously victorious class plaintiff.  The defendant is not harmed by 
the reexamination but instead gets a windfall – thereby lacking standing 
to complain. 
 
B.  Constitutional Rights, Such as Those Granted by the Seventh      
Amendment, May Be Waived 
 
“Although the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, like all Constitutional 
rights it can be waived by the parties.”94  This is especially well settled in 
civil litigation, where “[u]nlike other Constitutional rights, however, an 
intentional relinquishment of the right is not required for waiver; the 
right to a jury trial can be waived by inaction or acquiescence.”95  The 
waiver of a Constitutional right is enforceable so long as it is made 
knowingly and voluntarily.
96
  In fact, many of the rights accorded by the 
Bill of Rights can be waived under the same “voluntary, knowing, and 
informed” standards.97 
 
91. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding district 
court correctly ordered a trifurcated trial–one trial for issues of liability, “one trial on 
exemplary damages and one on compensatory damages”). 
92. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004); 
In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001). 
93. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (endorsing the “crucial 
assumption that the jurors followed the instructions given them by the trial judge”) 
(quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Woolley, supra note 15, at 526 n.136 (noting “the most invariable assumption 
of the law that jurors follow their instructions”) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 
200, 206 (1987)). 
94. In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir.1998) (citing United States 
v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 621 (1951)). 
95. Id. at 726. 
96. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
97. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (“Our precedents also 
place beyond doubt that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a 
defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”); 
21
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Similarly, any party that is seeking an issue certification under Rule 
23(c)(4) has the ability to waive its rights under the Seventh 
Amendment.
98
  As part of their motion to certify (in an abundance of 
caution), the plaintiffs who seek issue certification could waive their 
Seventh Amendment right against reexamination upfront, removing this 
potential problem and possible defense objection.  As part of the trial 
courts’ examination of adequacy of counsel, the court can assess if the 
waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  This 
assessment may occur at the class hearing, and the class representatives 
can be asked about waiving any reexamination issues during their 
depositions. 
 
IV.   Conclusion 
 
Issue certification is not always appropriate.  It may be that 
litigating the common issues fails to appreciably save any resources, or 
that small individual damages cannot incentivize a consumer to step 
forward and sue, even armed with a liability verdict.  Also, there must be 
some mechanism to ensure fair compensation for the class counsel that 
did the heavy lifting in trying the common issues to a successful verdict 
in the absence of a class fund that results when both liability and 
damages are tried together.  But the bogeyman of the potential of a 
Seventh Amendment violation from a “reexamination” by a second jury 
has too long been a throw in argument against class certification by class 
defendants clinging to a “divide and conquer” strategy that favors those 
with greater litigation resources.  Trying common issues limits the ability 
of a defendant to force plaintiffs to relitigate issues, dissipating some of 
their advantage.  Based upon the well-settled law of standing and 
ripeness, the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause is not a 
reasonable basis to deny certification of common issues.  Without that 
 
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87-88 (2004) (“While the Constitution ‘does not force a 
lawyer upon a defendant,’ it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent) (internal citations omitted); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (holding that the keystone to voluntary waiver of a Fourth 
Amendment right is the question of reasonableness). 
98. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). Of course, 
waiver of all Seventh Amendment rights happens constantly in America due to the 
proliferation of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts. 
See Hearing on Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair to 
Consumers? Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5 (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff Attorney); see also AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
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concern, the American legal system can move one step closer to the 
liberal standard of judicial discretion for issue certification intended by 
Rule 23. 
 
23
